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NOTE
UMC Electronics v. United States: Should
Reduction to Practice be a Requirement of
the On Sale Bar?*
Under the "on sale" bar of section 102(b) of the Patent
Act,' the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) may not issue
patents for inventions that have been placed "on sale in this
country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica-
tion for patent in the United States . *."..2 If the PTO does
issue a patent for an invention that was on sale more than one
year prior to the application date, courts may declare the pat-
ent invalid if it is subsequently challenged.3
For the invention to be found on sale within the meaning
of section 102(b), the challenger must show that the invention
was in an advanced stage of development at the time of the
offer for sale; a bare offer to sell is insufficient to invoke the
bar.4 Until recently, courts have required that the invention be
* Though not required by A Uniform System of Citation (The "Bluebook"), this
Note includes parallel cites to the United States Patent Quarterly for the convenience
of the reader.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1987). This Note will use the terms "on sale bar," "the bar,"
and "section 102(b) on sale bar" interchangeably to refer to the provision of 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b) that prohibits inventors from patenting inventions that have been placed on
sale in the United States more than one year before the inventor has filed a patent
application. See injfra note 2.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1987). The pertinent text of section 102(b) is as follows:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless -
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than
one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States
3. See D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphic Corp., 714 F.2d 1144, 1151, 219 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 13, 19 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("Patent No. 4,100,010 was, therefore, invalid within the
intent of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).").
4. Western Marine Elec. Co. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844-45, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 334, 337 (Fed. Cir. 1985). See also Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens
Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 639 (Fed. Cir. 1985) ("[A] bare
offer to sell does not ipso facto satisfy the 'on sale' bar .... ").
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reduced to practice at the time the offer for sale was made.5
Reduction to practice means not only that the invention has
been physically embodied in some form, but also that the
invention has been shown to work for its intended purpose.6
Thus, an invention was not placed on sale within the meaning
of section 102(b) until it had been embodied in physical form,
shown to work for its intended purpose, and offered for sale.
However, in UMC Electronics v. United States,7 the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) held that a reduc-
tion to practice was not a per se requirement of the on sale
bar.' According to the UMC court, the technical requisite of a
reduction to practice may frustrate the policies underlying the
on sale bar.' Therefore, instead of requiring the challenger to
show a reduction to practice, the UMC court held that future
courts should consider, in light of the policies underlying the
bar,10 all of the circumstances surrounding the sale or offer to
sell, including the stage of development and nature of the
invention sold." The UMC majority further held that an
invention has been placed on sale within the meaning of sec-
5. Great N. Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 165, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1986). See also Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 623, 225 U.S.P.Q. at
640 ("[T]he invention must have been sufficiently tested to demonstrate that it will
work for its intended purposes."). See also 1 P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 7.07 (2d ed. 1986) [hereinafter ROSENBERG]. But see Western
Marine, 764 F.2d at 844, 226 U.S.P.Q. at 337 ("It is not difficult to conceive of a
situation where, because the commercial benefits outside the allowed time have been
great, the technical requisite of . . . a physical embodiment . . . would defeat the
statutory policy .. ") (quoting Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata
Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 837, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 565 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(dicta)). One commentator who is critical of the reduction to practice requirement of
the on sale bar has noted that "all the cases found have held that an invention can be
'on sale' so as to commence the running of the one-year grace period only after the
claimed invention has been actually reduced to practice." 1 I. KAYTON, PATENT
PRACTICE 4-15 (1985) (citing CCPA cases), cited in UMC Electronics v. United States,
816 F.2d 647, 659 n.4, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1474 n.4 (dissent Smith) (Fed. Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 748 (1988).
6. See ROSENBERG, supra note 5, § 10.0112], and 2 D. CHISUM, PATENTS: A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF PATENTABILITY, VALIDITY AND INFRINGEMENT § 10.06 (1987)
[hereinafter CHISUM].
7. UMC, 816 F.2d 647, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465. For another discussion of UMC
and some of the issues raised by the decision, see Garrett, Comment: Reduction to
Practice and the On Sale Bar, J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 581 (1987) [hereinafter Garrett].
8. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471.
9. Id. at 653, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1469 (quoting Western Marine, 764 F.2d at 844, 226
U.S.P.Q.2d at 337). For a discussion of the policies underlying the on sale bar, see infra
text accompanying note 31.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 31-45.
11. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471.
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tion 102(b) when the inventor's commercial activities conflict
with the policies underlying the bar.12
I. INTRODUCTION
This Note asserts that the UMC court's "all circumstances"
test13 cannot be consistently applied and does not satisfy the
policies underlying the bar.' 4 Therefore, a test is proposed that
distinguishes between an offer to sell an invention and the
actual sale of an invention."5 The proposed test suggests that if
the invention is sold before the critical date, it has been placed
on sale within the meaning of section 102(b).' 6 However, if the
invention is merely offered for sale, it must have been reduced
to practice at the time of the offer before the on sale bar may
be applied.'7 Such a test would be more consistently applied
and better satisfies the policies underlying the on sale bar than
the UMC majority's all circumstances test.'8
In developing the test, this Note will first explain the poli-
cies that underly the on sale bar and review the past applica-
tion of the bar. 9 Second, the UMC case will be examined and
its facts and holding explained.20 Third, the panel majority's
conclusion that a reduction to practice has not been, and
should not be, a requirement of the on sale bar will be ana-
lyzed.2 ' Fourth, the problems of applying the UMC all circum-
stances test will be illustrated.22 Fifth, this Note will question
whether the UMC decision satisfies the policies underlying the
on sale bar.2 3 Finally, a proposed test will be presented and
applied to hypothetical situations to illustrate its application.24
12. Id. at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472. See also the discussion in Garrett, supra note
7, at 588-89.
13. In his dissent, Judge Smith referred to the panel majority's test as "the 'all
circumstances' rule." 816 F.2d at 664, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1478.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 146-62.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 167-73.
16. See infra text accompanying note 171.
17. See inkfra text accompanying note 172.
18. See infra text accompanying note 175.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 25-80.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 81-125.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 126-45.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 146-51.
23. See infra text accompanying notes 152-62.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 163-75.
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II. BACKGROUND
The purpose of this section is to give the reader an under-
standing of the on sale bar as it relates to patent law. With
this relationship in mind, this section will next discuss the four
policies that have been identified as underlying the on sale bar.
Finally, this section will summarize the various doctrines used
to apply the on sale bar in the past and describe the state of
the law immediately prior to the UMC decision.
A. The On Sale Bar And Its Underlying Policies
The Constitution empowers Congress to "promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times
to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries. ' 25
To effectuate this constitutional provision, Congress enacted
the Patent Act,26 which gives patent owners the right to
exclude27 others from using the patented inventions for a
period of seventeen years.28 Before the Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO) will issue a valid patent, however, the invention
must meet the requirements set forth in the Patent Act.29
The section 102(b) on sale bar is a requirement of the Pat-
ent Act that is procedural in nature; it limits the period of time
for filing a valid patent claim.3 0 This time limit furthers four
policy considerations, which are as follows: 1) To prevent det-
rimental public reliance on ideas that the public believes are
freely available to all; 2) to prevent the inventor from commer-
cially exploiting the patented invention beyond the seventeen-
year statutory period; 3) to give the inventor a grace period in
which to determine whether to file for a patent; and 4) to
encourage prompt and widespread disclosure of inventions.3 1
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
26. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-376 (1987).
27. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229, reh 'g denied, 376 U.S. 973
(1964) ("[Patents] are meant to encourage invention by rewarding the inventor with
the right ... to exclude others from the use of his invention."). The right to exclude
others may also be referred to as the grant of a statutory monopoly. Id.
28. 35 U.S.C. § 154. The patent system, in addition to fostering and rewarding
invention by awarding exclusive monopolies, stimulates further invention by
promoting disclosure of inventions. Further, through the use of strict requirements,
the patent system assures that "ideas in the public domain remain there for the free
use of the public." Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1978).
29. To be patentable, an invention must be of patentable subject matter, 35 U.S.C.
§ 101; must be original, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 115; must be novel, 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102; must
be useful, 35 U.S.C. § 101; and must be non-obvious (see infra note 63), 35 U.S.C. § 103.
30. See supra note 1. See also infra text accompanying note 149.
31. General Elec. Co. v. United States, 654 F.2d 55, 61, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 873
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A brief discussion of each of these four policy considerations
follows.
The first policy underlying the on sale bar is to prevent
detrimental public reliance on ideas that the public believes
are freely available to all.32 When an unpatented product is
sold to a member of the public, the public may assume that the
idea is free to use. Relying on this assumption, members of the
public may attempt to make, use, or sell the idea in the form of
a competing product. If a patent issues for the invention after
a member of the public has spent time and money on manufac-
turing a competing product, that time and money has been
wasted. This is because the patent gives the patent holder the
right to prevent the competitor from selling the competing
product if it infringes the patent.33 Under section 102(b), the
inventor must file for patent protection within a year after
selling the invention or lose the right to patent the invention.
The statute limits the amount of time that the invention is
exposed to the public without patent protection.34 Thus, the on
sale bar limits the waste that could occur should the public
rely to its detriment on the free availability of unpatented
products that have been sold or placed on sale.
The second justification for the on sale bar is that it pre-
vents commercial exploitation of inventions beyond the seven-
teen-year period 5 set by Congress in the Patent Act.36
Without the bar, inventors could commercially exploit their
inventions for more than a year and then patent the invention
and exclude their competitors from the market. For example,
an inventor could market an invention for three years and
(Cl. Ct. 1981) (citing Note, New Guidelines for Applying the On Sale Bar to
Patentability, 24 STAN. L. REV. 730, 732-36 (1972) [hereinafter New Guidelines]). See
also UMC, 816 F.2d at 652, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1468.
32. S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939); H.R. REP. NO. 961, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2. See also New Guidelines, supra note 31, at 733.
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-84. See also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
34. When an invention covered by a patent is sold in the form of a product, the
patent owner must mark the product with the term "patent" or "pat." and the number
of the patent or he or she will forfeit damages. 35 U.S.C. § 287. Such marking notifies
the public that it may not make, use, or sell products embodying the patented
invention without the patent owner's permission. Similarly, when an inventor applies
for a patent, he or she may mark products sold embodying the invention with the
terms "patent applied for" or "patent pending." Thus, members of the public are
warned that they will be forced to stop making, using, or selling the invention if a
patent later issues.
35. Id. § 154.
36. Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 156, 164 (Ct.
Cl. 1978). See also New Guidelines, supra note 31, at 734-35.
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then apply for a patent. When the patent issues,3 7 the inventor
is guaranteed a seventeen-year monopoly on the rights to the
invention. The original three-year period, plus the statutorily
guaranteed seventeen-year period, would effectively give the
inventor exclusive use of the invention for twenty years. By
preventing the PTO from issuing a valid patent after the
invention had been sold or on sale for more than one year, the
on sale bar prevents the inventor from thus extending patent
protection beyond the seventeen-year period. 8
In contrast to the previous policies, the third policy under-
lying the on sale bar favors the inventor. 9 Congress gave the
inventor one year after the sale or offer for sale of the inven-
tion to decide whether the invention was worth the expense of
obtaining a patent.40 If, after a year, the inventor decides that
the commercial prospects of the invention do not justify the
expense of obtaining a patent, the inventor may choose not to
patent the invention; the inventor thereby saves the time and
money required by the patent application process. In addition,
even if the inventor decides almost immediately after the sale
that a patent would be worthwhile, it may take some time for
the inventor and his or her patent counsel to complete a satis-
factory patent application.41 Thus, because the patent applica-
tion procedure may be protracted and expensive, Congress
gave the inventor a one-year grace period in which to deter-
mine whether to file for patent protection.42
The final policy underlying the on sale bar is the policy of
37. The phrase "patent issues" is often used as a shorthand method of stating that
the PTO issued a patent for a claimed invention.
38. However, since it gives the inventor a one-year grace period after sales activity,
§ 102(b), in effect, allows the inventor to extend the monopoly period for one year. Cf.
Gould, 579 F.2d at 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164 (Congress was concerned with encouraging
inventors to "prevent the commercial exploitation of an invention as a trade secret for
more than one year.").
39. Gould, 579 F.2d at 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164. See also S. REP. No. 338, 24th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836) (an inventor needs time to perfect invention); New Guidelines,
supra note 31, at 732, 735.
40. Gould, 579 F.2d at 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164. See also New Guidelines, supra
note 31, at 735.
41. Gould, 579 F.2d at 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164.
42. S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836). In its report, Congress stated
that "[o]ne-year is believed to be a very fair period to all concerned." Id. The fact that
Congress provided a grace period at all indicates that this period is perhaps the
primary purpose underlying the bar because by its very nature, such a grace period
undermines the other policies underlying the bar.
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promoting prompt disclosure of inventions.4 In an effort to
stimulate further innovation and permit the public to practice
the invention after the patent has expired," the Patent Act
requires full disclosure of the invention before a valid patent
will issue.45 Section 102(b) furthers this policy by denying pat-
ent protection if the invention is not disclosed in a patent
application within one year after sales to the public. The
threat of a loss of potentially valuable patent rights encourages
the inventor to disclose the invention to the PTO, and there-
fore the public, at an early date. Thus, the on sale bar pro-
motes prompt disclosure of inventions to the PTO.
B. Application of the On Sale Bar
Under section 102(b), an offer to sell the invention more
than one year prior to the date of application for the patent
will preclude the inventor from obtaining a valid patent.46
However, a bare offer to sell has never been considered suffi-
cient to invoke the bar; the courts also consider the circum-
stances surrounding the offer.47
In determining which circumstances are sufficient to
invoke the bar, the courts look to the invention's stage of
development 48 at the time that the offer was made.49 For
43. Gould, 579 F.2d at 580, 198 U.S.P.Q. at 164. See also New Guidelines, supra
note 31, at 733-34.
44. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230 (1963).
45. 35 U.S.C. §§ 112-14 (1987). Disclosure of the invention stimulates further
invention and permits public practice of the invention because disclosure requires the
inventor to describe his or her invention in detail. From this detailed description,
which is available to the public, other inventors may be stimulated to create inventions
based on the patented invention.
46. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
47. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613, 622, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Western Marine Elec., Inc. v. Furuno Elec.
Co., 764 F.2d 840, 844-45, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 337 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
48. To understand the application of the on sale bar, one must understand the
inventive process, which is the (actual setting in which the bar will be applied.
Generally, the inventive process may be described as follows. The inventor first
conceives the idea that will become the invention. Next, the inventor attempts to
embody his or her idea in a working prototype. The inventor then experiments with
the working prototype to determine whether the prototype will work as the inventor
originally conceptualized. When the inventor is satisfied that the prototype will work
as originally conceived, he or she applies for a patent. Finally, when the PTO decides
that the invention is patentable, a patent issues for the invention. See also In re Yarn
Processing Patent Validity Litig., 498 F.2d 271, 275, 183 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 65 (5th Cir.
1974) (the court articulates a four phase model that includes the following: (1)
conception; (2) attempts to embody idea in a working prototype; (3) experiments to
determine fitness for intended purpose; and (4) efforts to secure a patent).
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example, in Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libby-Owens Ford
Co., ° the CAFC upheld an instruction to the jury that the bar
does not apply unless the invention has been shown to be com-
mercially useful for the purpose intended.5 ' Because the jury
found that the process claimed52 in the patent had not func-
tioned for its intended purpose before the critical date, Shat-
terproof's activities were insufficient to invoke the bar.53
Therefore, even though there was an offer to sell products
made by the claimed process, the selling activities alone did not
invoke the bar because the invention was insufficiently devel-
oped at the time of the offer.
As illustrated by Shatterproof, the important question
when applying the on sale bar is: At what point is the inven-
tion sufficiently developed such that, coupled with an offer to
sell, the inventor's commercial activities invoke the on sale
bar?
One answer to this question is provided by the "on hand"
doctrine.' The on hand doctrine invokes the on sale bar very
late in the inventive process, requiring that "a device incorpo-
rating the invention must have existed in its ordinary or con-
templated usable form, and must have been on hand and ready
for delivery more than one year prior to the patent application
filing date.""5 To illustrate, in B.F Sturtevant v. Massachusetts
49. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 623, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 640 (invention must be
"functional" at the time of the offer to sell); Great N., 782 F.2d 159, 165, 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 356, 358 (requiring that the invention be shown to "work for its intended
purpose"); Western Marine, 764 F.2d at 845, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 338 (sonar system
"complete" before the critical date).
50. 758 F.2d 613, 225 U.S.P.Q. 634 (1985).
51. Id. at 623, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 640.
52. Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 112, the patent applicant must give a written
specification of the invention which (1) contains a written description of the invention,
describing the invention in full, clear, and concise terms, from which a person of
ordinary skill in the art to which it pertains may make and use the invention; and (2)
concludes with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the
subject matter of the invention.
53. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 623, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 640.
54. McCreery Eng. Co. v. Massachusetts Fan Co., 195 F. 498 (1st Cir. 1912). See
also B. F. Sturtevant Co. v. Massachusetts Hair & Felt Co., 124 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1941);
Galland-Henning Mfg. v. Dempster Bros., 315 F. Supp. 68, 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 688
(E.D. Tenn. 1970); Burke Elec. Co. v. Independent Pneumatic Tool Co., 234 F. 93, reh'g
denied per curiam, 232 F. 145 (2d Cir. 1916). For further discussion of the on hand
doctrine, see Garrett, supra note 7, at 582, and CHISUM, supra note 6, at § 6.02[61[a].
55. Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik AG v. Murata Mach., 731 F.2d at 836, 221
U.S.P.Q. ai 565 (Fed. Cir. 1984), quoting Galland-Henning, 315 F. Supp. at 80, 165
U.S.P.Q. at 696.
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Hair and Felt Co.,' the patent in question was for a custom-
made fan. 7 The First Circuit held that "[t]he critical date,
then, is not the date when the first Hagan fan was ordered but
the date when the order for it was filled. . . ."' The court
found that the fan was not on sale until it was "completed,
delivered, and accepted."' 9
The on hand doctrine has been rejected by many courts
applying the on sale bar.60  In Timely Products Corp. v.
Arron,6 ' the Second Circuit developed an alternate test for
applying the on sale bar which required that 1) the complete
invention claimed must be anticipated by,6 2 or obvious 63 in
view of, the thing offered for sale; 2) the invention must be
operable and commercially marketable at the time of the sale
or offer for sale; and 3) there must be a definite sale or offer
for sale, which is primarily for profit rather than for experi-
mental purposes. 4 The court held that, under the second
requirement, an invention is commercially marketable when it
has been reduced to practice.65
To illustrate the application of the Timely Products test,
56. 124 F.2d 95 (1st Cir. 1941).
57. Id. at 97.
58. Id.
59: Id. (quoting 1 WALKER ON PATENTS § 85 (Deller's ed.)).
60. See Dart Indus. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365, 179
U.S.P.Q. 392, 396 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 933 (1974); Barmag, 731 P.2d at
836, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 565; Timely Products Corp. v. Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 301-02, 187
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 265-67 (2nd Cir. 1975); Philco Corp. v. Admiral Corp., 199 F. Supp.
797, 816 (D. Del. 1961). See also CHISUM, supra note 6, at § 6.02[6][iii], and cases cited
therein; New Guidelines, supra note 31, at 736-37.
61. 523 F.2d 288, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257 (2nd. Cir. 1975).
62. Anticipation requires the presence, in a single prior art reference, of every
element of the claimed invention. Great N. Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad, Inc., 782 F.2d
159, 165, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The test for anticipation is
essentially the same as that for infringement. See CHISUM, supra note 6, at § 3.02[1]
("That which will infringe, if later, will anticipate, if earlier.") (quoting Knapp v.
Morss, 150 U.S. 221 (1893)). Thus, in the context of the on sale bar, the device offered
for sale anticipates the claimed device when the invention offered for sale identically
discloses every element of the claimed device.
63. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1987). This section states in pertinent part that "[a] patent
may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed . . . if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject
matter pertains." See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In the context
of the on sale bar, the invention offered for sale is the prior art over which the claimed
invention must be non-obvious.
64. Timely Products, 523 F.2d at 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 267-68.
65. Id.
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consider Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik v. Murata Machin-
ery, Ltd.' Barmag, the owner of the challenged patent, had
built a machine for processing filament yarn.67 The invention
claimed in the patent was fully anticipated by a machine con-
structed in March, 1975, satisfying the first requirement of the
Timely Products test.' Further, the machine was reduced to
practice at the time of the offer to sell, which satisfied the sec-
ond element of the test.69 Finally, the machine had been
offered for sale, for profit, on June 13, 1975, prior to the critical
date of June 30, 1975, satisfying the third element of the test.7°
Accordingly, Barmag's activities satisfied all of the elements of
the Timely Products test, and the patent was held invalid
because the invention had been on sale within the meaning of
section 102(b).7'
However, in Barmag, the CAFC declined to adopt the
Timely Products reduction to practice requirement in all cases,
stating in dicta that "[iut is not difficult to conceive of a situa-
tion where, because commercial benefits outside the allowed
time have been great, the technical requisite . .. of a physical
embodiment, particularly for a simple product, would defeat
the statutory policy .... 72
While not applying the Timely Products test per se, other
recent CAFC decisions were based on the premise that a
reduction to practice was a requirement of the on sale bar.
Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad 73 and Shatterproof
Glass v. Libbey-Owens Ford74 both held patents valid on the
assumption that a reduction to practice-the critical element of
the Timely Products test-was a requirement of the on sale
bar.75
66. 731 F.2d 831, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
67. Id. at 833, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 563.
68. Id. at 834, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 563.
69. Id. at 834, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 564.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 840, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 568.
72. Id. at 837, 221 U.S.P.Q. at 565.
73. 782 F.2d 159, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 356 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
74. 758 F.2d 613, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634 (1985). See also supra note 50 and
accompanying text.
75. In discussing whether reduction to practice was a requirement of the on sale
bar, the UMC court cited Great Northern, Shatterproof Glass, and In re Dybel, 524 F.2d
1393, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593 (C.C.P.A. 1975), as cases that appeared to be based on the
assumption that a reduction to practice is a requirement of the on sale bar. UMC, 816
F.2d 647, 654, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1469-70. However, in Dybel, the court noted
that "for an invention of the type involved here to be 'on sale,' it must be complete at
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In Great Northern, the patent was for a polystyrene foam
support for shipping rolls of web material.76 Great Northern
tested the foam support by shipping it to a web material manu-
facturer before the critical date.77 In finding the patent valid
and infringed, Judge Rich wrote that "[t]he district court con-
cluded, correctly we hold, that the invention was not reduced
to practice until after [the critical date], and, therefore, the
testing prior to that date did not constitute a section 102(b)
bar., 78
In Shatterproof Glass, the CAFC declined to apply the bar
even though, prior to the critical date, the patentee had con-
structed and begun product testing at a facility that produced
glass panels according to the patented process.79 Glass panels
manufactured during the testing period were not marketable,
and the court found that the process had not worked for its
intended purpose, i.e., had not been reduced to practice prior to
the critical date.80
Thus, prior to UMC, the CAFC had required that the
invention be at a stage in the inventive process where it has
been shown to be marketable at the time of the offer to sell
before applying the on sale bar. For proof that an invention is
marketable, Barmag, Great Northern, and Shatterproof all
required the challenger to show that the invention had been
reduced to practice at the time of the offer to sell. However,
because it concluded that the reduction to practice requisite of
a physical embodiment may frustrate the policies underlying
the bar, the Barmag court indicated that a technical reduction
to practice may not be required if those policies are defeated.
least to such an extent that the purchaser knows how it will perform." Dybel, 524 F.2d
at 1400, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 598. This statement does not contradict the UMC panel
majority's conclusion that the existence of the invention (reduction to practice) is only
relevant to the on sale issue so far as it illustrates the practicability of the invention at
the time of the offer for sale. Thus, although the case mentions in a footnote the lack
of reduction to practice of the claimed invention, In re Dybel, unlike Great Northern
and Shatterproof Glass, should not be read as clearly being based on the assumption
that a reduction to practice is a requirement of the on sale bar.
76. Great N., 782 F.2d at 159, 161, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 357.
77. Id. at 164, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 358.
78. Id. at 165, 228 U.S.P.Q. at 358.
79. Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at 613, 621, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 638-39.
80. Id. at 623-, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 640.
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III. THE FACTS AND HOLDING OF UMC Electronics Co. v.
United States
This section will begin by relating the facts of UMC Elec-
tronics v. United States and the trial court's decision holding
the subject patent valid. Next, the section will summarize the
CAFC's decision reversing the trial court's holding of validity,
with particular emphasis being placed on the rule of law that
the court developed for applying the on sale bar.
A. The Facts and the Claims Court Decision
UMC Electronics, as Weaver's assignee, brought an action
against the United States for infringement of U.S. Patent No.
3,643,513 (the Weaver patent).81 The Weaver patent disclosed
an aviation counting accelerometer (ACA).82 The inventor,
Weaver, had designed the ACA described in this patent in an
effort to secure a Navy contract for UMC, but the contract was
instead awarded to UMC's competitor, Systron-Donner Corpo-
ration.8 3 UMC alleged that the Systron-Donner ACA infringed
the claims of the Weaver patent and sought compensation from
the Navy due to the Navy's use of the ACA provided by Sys-
tron-Donner.84
The government defended on the grounds85  that the
Weaver patent was invalid because the invention described
therein had been on sale for more than one year prior to the
date on which the patent application was filed.8 6 The patent
application was filed on August 1, 1968.87 Thus, the critical
date for the purposes of the on sale bar was August 1, 1967;
that is, the government was required to show that UMC's
actions prior to August 1, 1967, with respect to the ACA
described in the Weaver patent, satisfied the requirements of
the on sale bar.
81. UMC, 816 F.2d at 648, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465.
82. Id. at 649, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1465-66. An ACA is a device mounted on an aircraft
that measures and records acceleration loading on the aircraft. Records of acceleration
can indicate an aircraft's remaining useful life and show the need for structural
overhaul or rotation to less demanding service. I&
83. Id. at 650, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466.
84. UMC, 816 F.2d at 650, 2 U.S.P.Q. at 1467.
85. The government also defended on the grounds that the Systron-Donner ACA
did not infringe upon the UMC ACA; that the Weaver patent was anticipated by the
prior art; that the Weaver patent was obvious in view of the prior art; and that Weaver
failed to describe the best mode of operation. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. 604 (1984).
86. Id. at 611-12.
87. Id. at 606.
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It was not controverted that on July 27, 1967, four days
prior to the critical -date, UMC submitted a proposal to the
Navy to supply it with the ACA that was later claimed in the
Weaver patent.88 Further, it was undisputed that Weaver had
conducted tests to his satisfaction on the only part of his inven-
tion that had not been embodied in the prior art. 9 However,
the trial court found that a prototype built in May of 1967 did
not embody independent claim 190 of the Weaver patent and,
thus, no physical embodiment of the invention had existed
prior to the critical datef' Despite finding that no physical
embodiment of the Weaver patent existed prior to the critical
date, the Claims Court nevertheless concluded that the Weaver
patent had been reduced to practice by its May, 1967,
prototype.92
To determine whether the Weaver patent had been on sale
88. UMC, 816 F.2d at 650, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466.
89. Id. at 650, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1466, 1472. The Weaver patent taught an ACA
basically comprised of (1) an analog transducer for transferring the mechanical force
of the aircraft's acceleration into an electrical signal; (2) a filter for eliminating
transient accelerations from the electrical signal; and (3) a means for timing the
accelerations and recording those accelerations that persisted for a predetermined
time. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 608-15. The prior art disclosed essentially the same ACA, but
the prior art used a mechanical transducer. Id. at 615. Further, the analog transducer
that Weaver used was known, but had not been used in the art of designing ACA's, at
the time that Weaver designed the invention described in the Weaver patent.
90. A claim is a statement at the end of the specification in a patent application
that specifies the metes and bounds of the invention that the inventor is claiming as
his or her own. For general discussions of claims, see CHISUM, supra note 6, at §§ 8.01-
.02, ROSENBURG, supra note 5, at § 14.01, and JOHN L. LANDIS, MECHANICS OF PATENT
CLAIM DRAFTING (1974). For Weaver's claims, see UMC, 816 F.2d at 649, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1465-66.
91. Id. at 651, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468. Because an invention must physically exist in
order to be reduced to practice, the Claims Court's finding of reduction to practice
apparently contradicts its finding that Weaver had not embodied his invention in
physical form. However, the trial court's finding that no physical embodiment of the
invention existed was made during its analysis of the element of the Timely Products
test which requires that the claimed invention be embodied in, or obvious in view of,
the invention offered for sale. In determining whether the claimed invention was
obvious in view of the thing offered for sale, the court looked to the prototype of
Weaver's ACA as the thing that had been offered for sale. As the claimed invention
was not obvious in view of the prototype, the court concluded that the Weaver patent
was not invalid under the Timely Products test. However, the court erred by
considering the prototype as the thing offered for sale. The ACA offered for sale was
the device described in UMC's offer to the Navy. Thus, under the Timely Products
test, the Claims Court should have asked first whether the invention offered for sale
had been reduced to practice by the prototype of the ACA, and second, whether the
claimed invention was obvious in view of the thing offered for sale. See infra notes
133-45 and accompanying text.
92. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 620.
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within the meaning of section 102(b) of the Patent Act, the
Claims Court used the three-part Timely Products test as
adopted by the United States Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (CCPA)93 in In Re Corcoran.94 In applying this test,
the Claims Court found that UMC's offer to sell was for profit,
and not for experimental purposes, and that the subject of the
Weaver patent had been reduced to practice, thereby satisfying
the second and third requirements of the Timely Products
test.95
For its first requirement, however, the Timely Products
test required a patent's challenger to show that the complete
invention claimed must have been embodied in, or obvious in
view of, the thing offered for sale. 6 Since the prototype built
in May 1967 did not embody Weaver's claim 1, the trial court
found that the Weaver patent was not obvious in view of its
prototype.97 Accordingly, the Claims Court concluded that this
requirement of the test was not met and that the Weaver pat-
ent was not invalid under the section 102(b) on sale bar.9s
B. The CAFC Decision
Weaver appealed the Claims Court's subsequent finding of
no infringement, and the government cross-appealed to have
the Weaver patent declared invalid.99 On the second issue, the
CAFC concluded that the Claims Court erred as a matter of
law and reversed the lower court's finding that the Weaver
93. The CCPA was a predecessor court of the CAFC. See infra note 131.
94. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 619. In re Cororan, 640 F.2d 1331, 1333-34, 208 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 867, 870-71, (C.C.P.A. 1981), used the test developed in Timely Products v.
Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 267-68. The Timely Products test is
set forth supra in the text accompanying notes 61-64.
95. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 620-21. However, before applying the first part of the Timely
Products test, the Claims Court further noted that, in reviewing a lower court's
application of the test, the CAFC in Barmag refused to condition the on sale bar upon
the existence of a physical embodiment in all cases. Barmag, 731 F.2d 831, 836-37, 221
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 565. See also text accompanying note 72. The Claims Court,
construing this reservation, found that UMC had reaped no commercial benefits
outside the statutory period. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 620. Thus, the court looked for a
reduction to practice before it applied the bar.
96. Timely Products, 523 F.2d 288, 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 267.
97. UMC, 8 Cl. Ct. at 621.
98. Id. After finding the Weaver patent valid, the Claims Court went on to find
that the Weaver patent was not infringed because the government did not make use of
the device covered by the Weaver patent. Id. at 627. Accordingly, the Claims Court
dismissed the complaint and denied UMC recovery for its infringement claim. Id.
99. UMC, 816 F.2d at 650, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1467.
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patent was valid.100
Because reduction to practice requires that the invention
exist in physical form, the CAFC first noted the inconsistency
of the Claims Court's concurrent findings that the Weaver pat-
ent was not embodied in physical form but was reduced to
practice.1" 1 Therefore, the court found that the Weaver patent
could not have been reduced to practice prior to the critical
date.102
Under the Timely Products test, a finding of no reduction
to practice would have ended the inquiry, because an invention
that is not reduced to practice cannot be commercially market-
able as required by the test. However, the UMC court then re-
examined its precedent and found that a "reduction to practice
of the claimed invention has not been... an absolute require-
ment of the on sale bar"1 3 and addressed the question of
whether a reduction to practice should be a requirement of the
bar.1 0 4
In answering this question, the court first noted that some
courts1 5 applying the bar, in an effort to circumvent the reduc-
tion to practice requirement, had looked to whether the inven-
tion had been "sufficiently" reduced to practice for the
purposes of the on sale bar."° The majority noted that a "suf-
ficiently" reduced to practice standard would have deleterious
effects on priority determinations in interference contests. 10 7
100. Id. As a preliminary matter, however, the CAFC noted the inconsistency in
the Claims Court's finding that the invention taught by the Weaver patent had been
reduced to practice without a physical embodiment and concluded that the lower court
had erred in holding that there had been a reduction to practice. Id. at 651-52, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468.
101. UMC, 816 F.2d at 651-52, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468. But see supra note 91.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471.
104. Id. at 652-56, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1468-71.
105. In Dart Indus. v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours and Co., 489 F.2d 1359, 1365, 179
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 392, 396 (7th Cir. 1973), the case cited by the UMC court, the Seventh
Circuit found that the product sold had been "sufficiently reduced to practice to avoid
the [other] reference." However, the Dart court went on to note that the product
"achieved commercial success in the form in which it was sold." Id. Thus while it
used the phrase "sufficiently reduced to practice," the product was probably reduced to
practice at the time of the offer to sell.
106. UMC, 816 F.2d at 654-55, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1470.
107. For example, in the interference context, where two inventors are vying for a
patent on the basis of who reduced the invention to practice first, it has been noted
that "[tihere [can be] no degrees of reduction to practice; either one has or has not
occurred." Wolter v. Belicka, 409 F.2d 255, 262, 161 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 335, 340 (C.C.P.A.
1969) (Rich, J., dissenting).
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Therefore, the court held that the desirability of maintaining a
consistent definition of reduction to practice in other areas of
patent law militated in favor of abandoning reduction to prac-
tice as a per se requirement of the on sale bar." 8
More importantly, the panel majority next interpreted the
sections 102(b)/103 bar,0 9 as discussed by the CCPA in In re
Foster,"' as suggesting that a reduction to practice was inher-
ently inconsistent with the section 103 obviousness determina-
tion.' The panel majority stated:
Implicit in the operation of a sections 102(b)/103 bar is the
absence of a reduction to practice of the claimed invention
as a requirement for the bar to operate. The invention, i.e.,
as claimed with all elements, is not the subject of the sale. If
it were, section 103 would not be involved. With respect to
non-claimed subject matter of the sale in a sections 102(b)/
103 situation, it is meaningless to speak of "reduction to
practice" of what was sold. "Reduction to practice" relates
only to the precise invention expressed in a claim. Thus, the
second requirement of Timely Products, reduction to prac-
tice of the claimed invention, is inherently inconsistent with
the first requirement under which the bar is applicable if the
claimed invention is merely "obvious in view of the thing
offered for sale."" 2
In effect, the court found that since an invention offered for
sale becomes part of the prior art, and an invention need not
be reduced to practice to be obvious in view of the prior art,
then the claimed invention need not be reduced to practice.
Since the court found that adoption of a reduction to prac-
tice requirement was inherently inconsistent with the non-
obviousness requirement of section 103 and may create prece-
dent that would adversely affect priority determinations, it
concluded that a reduction to practice should not be an abso-
lute requirement of the on sale bar.
Having abandoned reduction to practice as anything but an
analytical tool," 3 the court declined "to formulate a standard
108. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471. But see infra text accompanying
notes 129-32.
109. See supra note 63 for the pertinent text of 35 U.S.C. § 103.
110. 343 F.2d 980, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593 (C.C.P.A. 1965), cert denied, 383 U.S.
966, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 906 (1966).
111. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471.
112. Id.
113. Id. The panel majority stated that "a reduction to practice of the claimed
invention 'may, of course, lighten the burden of the party asserting the bar."' Id.,
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for determining when something less than a complete embodi-
ment of the invention will suffice under the on sale bar." '114
Instead, the court held that "all of the circumstances surround-
ing the sale or offer to sell, including the stage of development
of the invention and the nature of the invention, must be con-
sidered and weighed against the policies underlying section
102(b). 115
Although it declined to formulate a precise set of require-
ments like the requirements set out by the Timely Products
court, the UMC court pointed out minimum requirements and
burdens of proof. First, the court held that the challenger has
the burden of showing "a definite sale or offer to sell more
than one year before the application for the subject pat-
ent.... "116 Second, the challenger must show "that the subject
matter of the sale or offer to sell fully anticipated the claimed
invention or would have rendered the claimed invention obvi-
ous by its addition to the prior art."'117 Third, once the chal-
lenger has established these two criteria, the UMC court held
that the burden shifts to the patent holder "to come forward
with an explanation of the circumstances surrounding what
would otherwise appear to be a commercialization [of the pat-
ented subject matter] outside the grace period." 1 "
Applying these rules of law to the uncontested facts, the
CAFC found that UMC had offered to sell the claimed inven-
tion prior to the critical date.1 9 The court then found that the
device offered for sale was the same as that described in the
Weaver patent.' 20 From these facts the CAFC found evidence
(quoting General Elec. Co. v. United States, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 260, 271 (1979) aff'd
on other grounds, 654 F.2d 55, 211 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867 (Ct. CI. 1981) (en banc)).
114. Id. at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472. For a different analysis of the UMC court's
holding, see Garret, supra note 7, at 586-89.
115. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1471-72. The court formulated the "all
circumstances" test.
116. Id. at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
117. Id. These two criteria do not substantially depart from the requirements of
Timely Products. The UMC court's requirement of a sale or offer to sell is implicit in
the first and third requirements of the Timely Products test. In addition, both UMC
and Timely Products require that the identity of the invention offered for sale be
established as that of the claimed invention. UMC states this identity requirement
using the terms "fully anticipated" and "obvious," UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d
at 1472, while Timely Products requires that the claimed invention be "embodied in"
(anticipation) or "obvious in view of" the invention offered for sale, Timely Products,
523 F.2d at 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 267.
118. UMC, 816 F.2d at 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
119. Id. at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
120. Id.
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of "an attempt to commercialize the invention of the [Weaver]
patent ... and thereby to expand the grace period in contra-
vention of the policies underlying the statute."'' The court
then looked to UMC to explain the commercial activities that
occured prior to the critical date. 22
The court dismissed UMC's argument that it had not
reduced the invention to practice as "purely technical.' 1 3 The
court, after looking at "all of the circumstances surrounding
the sale," found that the "substantial embodiment" of the
invention, Weaver's subjective belief that the device would
work, and the extent of Weaver's contribution to the art were
evidence that the invention was sufficiently developed for the
purpose of applying the on sale bar.12' Coupled with this
advanced stage of development, the commercial activities of
UMC were sufficient for the panel majority to find that the
invention covered by the Weaver patent was on sale within the
meaning of section 102(b)." 5
IV. CRITICISM OF THE CAFC's ANALYSIS
This section gives an overview of the criticism of the
CAFC's approach to arriving at its decision in UMC. The sec-
tion will begin with Judge Smith's argument that a reduction
to practice requirement was clearly part of the precedent bind-
ing the CAFC. Next, this section illustrates other flaws in the
panel majority's reasoning that undermine its conclusion that
reduction to practice should not be a requirement of the on
sale bar.
In his dissent, Judge Smith severely criticized the
approach that the panel majority took in concluding that a
reduction to practice was not, and should not be, a prerequisite
for applying the on sale bar.1 6 In particular, Judge Smith
strongly objected to the conclusion that prior decisions had not
addressed whether reduction to practice was a requirement for
application of the on sale bar. In his opinion, "[o]ur past deci-
sions have consistently held.., that a device must be in exist-
ence and shown to work for its intended purpose (the classical
definition of reduction to practice) before the on sale bar can
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 1&L at 658-65, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473-79.
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apply."' 2 v This precedent, Judge Smith argued, "was being
allowed to slip silently into the backwaters of the law simply
by ignoring it."' 28
Beyond its conclusion that reduction to practice had not
been a requirement of the on sale bar, the panel majority also
concluded that a reduction to practice should not be a require-
ment of the bar.'29 The court, noting that other courts had
used a "sufficiently" reduced to practice standard, expressed
concern about the adverse effects of a relaxed reduction to
practice standard in priority determinations. 130
However, this Note argues that fear of a relaxed reduction
to practice requirement is not a compelling reason for aban-
doning reduction to practice as a prerequisite in on sale bar
cases. Consistent appellate court decisions in cases applying the
on sale bar would alleviate this concern. The CAFC, being the
sole appellate court for patent appeals, 1  is in a position to
ensure that the standard is not relaxed. Hence, the panel
majority's argument does not militate against adoption of
reduction to practice for applying section 102(b) as much as it
militates in favor of the CAFC maintaining a consistent reduc-
tion to practice standard in all types of cases. 32
127. Id. at 658, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473. The most disturbing aspect of the panel
majority's conclusion that reduction to practice was not a requirement of the on sale
bar was that the conclusion allowed the panel to rule on whether such should be a
requirement of the on sale bar without the entire court sitting en banc. See South
Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370 n.2, 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 657, 658 n.2 (1982).
In any event, this Note does not dispute whether the court was bound by precedent to
adhere to a reduction to practice requirement, opting instead to concentrate on
whether the reduction to practice should be a requirement of the bar.
128. UMC, 816 F.2d at 658, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1473.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 109-11.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
131. The CAFC was formed in a merger between the United States Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and has sole appellate
jurisdiction over patent cases. In South Corp. v. United States, 690 F.2d 1368, 1370, the
CAFC adopted the precedent of its predecessor courts. See also Petrowitz, Federal
Court Reform: The Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982-And Beyond, 32 AM. U.
L. REV. (1983).
132. In addition, abandoning the requirement of a physical embodiment in on sale
bar cases may have the unintended effect of creating greater uncertainty in
interference law. In UMC, the court has, in effect, held that an invention can be
shown to work for its intended purpose without a physical embodiment. From this
premise, attorneys in priority contests may argue that the issue should not be whether
the invention was in existence, but whether it has been shown to work as intended-
that physical embodiment is a mere technicality. Thus, contrary to its wishes, the
panel majority's holding could conceivably create greater uncertainty in the area of
interference law.
150 University of Puget Sound Law Review
The second reason that the court gave for not adopting a
reduction to practice as a requirement of the on sale bar is that
reduction to practice is inherently inconsistent with the con-
cept that the claimed invention need only be obvious in view of
the thing offered for sale."'3 The court based its conclusion on
the premise that an invention that has not been reduced to
practice may become prior art merely by being offered for
sale. 3 From this premise, it is logical to conclude that the
claimed invention need not be reduced to practice, because a
claimed invention does not have to be reduced to be obvious in
view of the prior art. However, this premise assumes what the
court was trying to prove-that an invention need not be
reduced to practice to be on sale within the meaning of section
102(b). Thus, the court addressed the wrong question when
determining if a reduction to practice should be a requirement
of the on sale bar. Instead of asking if the claimed invention
need be reduced to practice, the court should ask if the inven-
tion offered for sale need be reduced to practice.
An analysis of the sections 102(b)/103 bar illustrates that a
requirement of reduction to practice of the invention offered
for sale is not inconsistent with a requirement that the claimed
invention be obvious in view of the thing offered for sale. The
sections 102(b)/103 bar is based on the assumption that it does
not matter how the public comes into possession of the inven-
tion.x35 Whether it be by public use, sale, prior patent, or pub-
lication, once the invention is in public possession, the
invention is prior art over which the claimed invention must
be non-obvious. 36 It follows that section 102(b) and the section
103 non-obviousness requirement work together to prevent
inventors from circumventing the on sale bar when the
claimed invention is not completely anticipated by the inven-
tion offered for sale.'37 Thus, if the invention offered for sale
does not completely disclose the claimed invention, section 103
133. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10.
134. See supra text accompanying note 111.
135. In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 173 (C.C.P.A. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966).
136. Id.; In re Corcoran, 640 F.2d 1331, 1334, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 870 (C.C.P.A.
1981).
137. See Foster, 343 F.2d at 988, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 173. In Foster the CCPA
stated that "[t]here appears to be no dispute about the operation of this statute in the
'complete anticipation' situations but the contention seems to be that 102(b) has no
applicability where the invention is not completely disclosed.... [W]e are convinced
that this contention is contrary to the policy consideration .... " Id.
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requires the additional elements of the invention to be non-
obvious in view of the invention offered for sale, which has
become part of the prior art by virtue of its sale.
The CCPA's application of the sections 102(b)/103 bar in
In Re Corcoran'" illustrates the necessity of reduction to prac-
tice of the invention offered for sale. In Corcoran, the Patent
and Trademark Office Board of Appeals found that Corcoran
had made a detailed offer for sale of pre-slit window shade
material, accompanied by samples.'39 The sample of shade
material was evidence that the invention offered for sale had
been reduced to practice when Corcoran made the offer. On
appeal, Judge Rich, writing for the majority, held that the
shade material had been offered for sale under the require-
ments of the Timely Products test, and was thus not patentable
under section 102(b). a° Therefore, the invention offered for
sale, the shade material, became part of the prior art over
which the claimed invention must be patentable.1 41 Corcoran's
claims were primarily for the window shade material, but also
included supports for the material and tabs to indicate where
the material had been slit." The supports and tabs were obvi-
ous in view of the shade material that had become part of the
prior art under section 102(b). Therefore, the claimed inven-
tion, even containing additional elements, was not patentable
under section 103.143
The premise of the In re Corcoran court's section 103 anal-
ysis was that the shade material had been offered for sale
under 102(b) and had become part of the prior art as a result.
If the shade material had not been reduced to practice at the
time it was offered for sale, it is unlikely that the court would
have found it on sale within the meaning of section 102(b). 4
Since the shade material would not have been on sale, it would
not have become prior art over which the invention with tabs
and supports needed to be patentable under section 103. Thus,
a reduction to practice of the invention offered for sale was
138. 640 F.2d 1331, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
139. Id. at 1332, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 868.
140. Id. at 1333-34, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 870.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1332, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 868-69.
143. Id. at 1334, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 870.
144. The court did not expressly base its decision on a finding of reduction to
practice, but it found all of the elements of the Timely Products test satisfied,
including the requirement of reduction to practice. Id.
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essential to finding the claimed invention obvious. 14 5
Accordingly, while the differences between the claimed
invention and the invention offered for sale need not be
reduced to practice, the invention offered for sale does need to
be reduced to practice under the sections 102(b)/103 analysis.
Therefore, contrary to the CAFC's conclusion, the two Timely
Products requirements of reduction to practice of the invention
offered for sale and obviousness are not inherently inconsis-
tent. Thus, section 103 does not preclude the adoption of
reduction to practice as an element of the section 102(b) on
sale bar.
In summary, the panel majority's reasons for concluding
that a reduction to practice was not, and should not be, a
requirement of the on sale bar are unconvincing.
V. CRITICISM OF THE "ALL CIRCUMSTANCES" TEST
This section illustrates some of the practical problems
inherent in the panel majority's all circumstances test.
First, the decision does not provide, and the panel majority
expressly refused to give, lower courts firm standards for
determining when less than a complete embodiment of the
invention will invoke the on sale bar.146 The decision is based
on factors that do not translate into a standard that may be
easily applied to other fact situations.147 Accordingly, future
courts are left to determine on an ad hoc basis when an inven-
tion is sufficiently embodied for purposes of the on sale bar. 48
145. For another more recent application of the sections 102(b)/103 bar, see Baker
Oil Tools, Inc. v. Geo Vann, Inc., 828 F.2d 1558, 1561-64, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1210, 1213-
15 (Fed. Cir. 1988). In Baker Oil, the court stated that "[i]f a device was in public use
or on sale before the critical date, then the device becomes a reference under § 103
against the claimed invention." Id
146. UMC, 816 F.2d at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
147. As explained in the text accompanying infra note 152, the factor of
commercial activities does not help future courts apply the on sale bar because
commercial activities, under the UMC court's analysis, will be present in every case.
The "extent to which Weaver had developed his invention" provides no guidance as it
is a conclusory statement that is applicable only to the facts of UMC. "Weaver's
subjective opinion that his invention would work" will not enable future courts to
discern when an invention has been placed on sale because most inventors believe that
their invention will eventually work; if they did not, they would not attempt to reduce
the invention to practice. And finally, "the extent of Weaver's addition to prior art"
merely reintroduces a requirement similar to the non-obviousness requirement of
§ 103 by requiring courts to again compare the invention with the prior art.
148. One commentator has likened the CAFC's analysis of the on sale bar in UMC
to the Supreme Court's analysis of 35 U.S.C. § 103 in Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S.
1 (1966). See Garrett, supra note 7, at 587-88. The comparison is apt, but it is not clear
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Second, the on sale bar is in the nature of a statute of limi-
tations.149 Judge Smith stated in his dissent in UMC that, "[a]s
in statutes of limitations generally, the start of a statutory bar
must be reasonably clear at the time it occurs.... The long his-
tory of section 102(b), which effects the irretrievable loss of a
valuable right, shows judicial and congressional recognition of
the need for reasonable certainty."'"5 Because the all circum-
stances test does not provide firm standards for its application,
it does not provide the certainty required to start the grace
period running. Thus, the all circumstances test allows neither
the inventor whose right is at risk, nor the courts that must
apply the bar, to discern with accuracy the commencement,
and thus the expiration, of the statutory period.' 5 '
VI. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
As applied in UMC, the all circumstances test undermines
or frustrates the policies undergirding the section 102(b) on
sale bar for several reasons.
First, the court's reasons for concluding that UMC's activi-
ties violated the policy against commercial exploitation 5 2
undermine the policy as a tool for applying the on sale bar.
The panel majority concluded that UMC's offer to sell evi-
denced an "attempt to commercializ[e]" Weaver's invention." 3
This conclusion hinges on the court's definition of commercial
exploitation. Implicitly, the court defined commercial
exploitation as an offer to sell an invention for profit. This
definition of commercial exploitation is so broad that it eviscer-
why an essentially procedural requirement like the on sale bar should be accorded
treatment similar to the very substantive analysis of § 103 in Graham. Instead, a more
appropriate analogy can be drawn between § 102(b) and the requirement for filing a
Notice of Appeal. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a). If a party fails to file notice of appeal
within 30 days (60 days if the government is a party) after a final judgment, the right
to appeal is permanently lost. Thus, like the on sale bar, the notice of appeal "effects
the irretrievable loss of a valuable right." See text accompanying note 150. Moreover,
in the interests of certainty, the federal rule dealing with notice of appeal is inflexible
and mechanically applied. Similar reasons dictate that, instead of creating a flexible
framework for analysis like that of Graham, the on sale bar should be a certain,
mechanical rule that is applied without flexibility.
149. See in re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 987-88, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 173 (C.C.P.A.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966 (1966). Judge Almond compared the on sale bar to a
statute of limitations, which begins when the invention becomes available to the public
through the categories of disclosure enumerated in § 102(b). Id.
150. UMC, 816 F.2d at 659-60, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1474.
151. See supra note 148.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
153. UMC, 816 F.2d at 657, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1472.
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ates commercial exploitation as a tool for applying the on sale
bar because, at a minimum, all patent holders whose patents
are challenged under the on sale bar have placed their inven-
tions on sale.154 Thus, the panel majority's reasoning has made
violation of the policy against prolonged commercial exploita-
tion inevitable in every case in which the on sale issue is
raised.
Instead of defining commercial exploitation as an offer to
sell for profit, courts should require actual commercial
exploitation of the invention before finding the policy vio-
lated.' Actual commercial exploitation would require a sale
or a contract for sale."5 6 If the facts show that the inventor
profited from the invention, then he or she has clearly violated
the policy against prolonged commercial exploitation.157 If the
inventor has not profited from the invention, then the policy
has not been violated.
Briefly then, the panel majority's implicit definition of
commercial exploitation is too broad, and courts should instead
define commercial exploitation as the actual commercial
exploitation of the invention, which requires an actual sale or
contract for sale of the invention claimed in the challenged
patent.
The second policy ill-served by the all circumstances test is
the policy of giving the inventor a grace period in which to
decide whether to file for a patent.5 8 In 1939, when it reduced
154. Almost any activity with an invention is motivated by profit, because the
inventor is motivated by the economic incentive of patent protection. See supra note
27.
155. A line of cases has held that "mere existence of a sales contract is insufficient
to establish a placing on sale" within the meaning of § 102(b). See National Business
Sys. v. AM Int'l, 743 F.2d 1227, 1237, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1011, 1019, (Fed. Cir. 1984)
and cases cited therein. To the extent that these cases hold that an invention is not on
sale even though it is the subject of a valid contract for sale, these cases should be
overruled as being contrary to the policy against prolonged commercial exploitation of
the invention. However, to the extent that they state that a court should examine the
details of the sales contract to make sure that the contract is not executory and is for
the device claimed in the disputed patent, these holdings merely state a truism that
does not affect the rule developed later in this Note. See In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393,
187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 593 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (executory contract for sale insufficient where
there was no evidence that the purchaser knew how the invention would perform).
156. See infra text accompanying note 171.
157. Cf. Western Marine Elec. Co. v. Furuno Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 334 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (a sonar system was sold for profit prior to the critical
date).
.158. See supra text accompanying notes 31, 40-42.
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the grace period from two years to one year, 5 9 Congress reiter-
ated that the law "thus permits an inventor, after his invention
is fully completed, to make the invention known to the public
for a period of two [changed to one] years before filing his
application for patent."'" Thus, Congress' intent was to give
the inventor one year after the invention was "fully com-
pleted" to "make his mind up whether or not to file an applica-
tion for patent.' 16 '
However, even when the inventor is satisfied with the
invention as conceived, an invention that has never been built
will nevertheless require substantial work before it is "fully
completed."' 62 To find, as did the UMC panel majority, that
less than a physical embodiment of an invention is sufficient
for the invention to be "fully completed" does not realistically
allow the inventor to evaluate the commercial prospects of the
invention. A better approach is to start the one-year grace
period only after the invention has been built and shown to
work for its intended purpose; only then may an inventor real-
istically evaluate the invention's economic prospects.
Accordingly, because the purpose of the grace period is
satisfied only after the invention has been reduced to practice,
the panel majority's test undermines the policy of giving the
inventor a grace period in which to decide whether to file for
patent protection.
159. Congress reduced the grace period because "under present conditions 2 years
appears unduly long and operates as a handicap to industry." S. REP. No. 876, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2.
160. S. REP. No. 876, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1939); H.R. REP. No. 961, 76th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2.
161. S. REP. No. 338, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1836). See also supra note 39.
162. In In re Dybel, 524 F.2d 1393, 1400, 187 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 593, 598 (C.C.P.A.
1975), the CCPA noted that to be on sale an invention "must be complete at least to
such an extent that the purchaser knows how it will perform." The court correctly
emphasized that the completeness of the invention reflects the seriousness of the
parties to the sale. An inventicn that is only partially complete is unlikely to receive
serious consideration from a prospective buyer. In Barmag Barmer Maschinenfabrik
AG v. Murata Machinery, Ltd., 731 F.2d 831, 837, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 561, 565 (Fed.
Cir. 1984), the CAFC noted that another element of the calculus for determining
whether an invention has been placed on sale is the type of product to be sold. The
court noted that "simple" products may not need be reduced to practice, presumably
because the inventor of a simple product may know that the product is commercially
marketable without a reduction to practice. Id. See also In Re Dybel, 524 F.2d at 1400,
187 U.S.P.Q. at 598 ("an invention of the type involved here .... ").
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VII. SUGGESTED MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF THE
ON SALE BAR
The following section first states the goals of a test for
applying the section 102(b) on sale bar. Next, it suggests a test
to be used by courts applying the bar in the future. Finally, it
applies this test to a variety of factual situations to illustrate
how the test works and how it satisfies the policies underlying
the bar.
A test for applying the on sale bar should accomplish
three goals. First, the test should accommodate the policies
that underly the on sale bar.163 It must ensure that inventors
are not allowed to commercially exploit their inventions
beyond the statutory period, prevent the public from relying to
its detriment on inventions already publically disclosed, and
encourage prompt filing of patent applications. At the same
time it should guarantee inventors the grace period mandated
by Congress.
Second, the proposed test should allow courts to be consis-
tent in applying the on sale bar, but still retain the flexibility
necessary for applying the test to a wide variety of factual situ-
ations.' 64 To be consistently applied, the test must allow both
the court and the inventor to determine objectively when the
one-year grace period begins.'6
Third, the proposed test should be in accord with binding
precedent. 66
This Note proposes the following test:
1. The burden shall be on the challenger 16 7 to show that,
more than one year prior to the date when the inventor filed
the patent application,"~ the inventor offered for sale an
invention that either
a) fully anticipated the invention later claimed in the
163. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 146-51. See also UMC, 816 F.2d 647, 653, 2
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1469 ("Rigid standards are especially unsuited to the on sale
provision where the policies underlying the bar, in effect, define it"), and cases cited
therein.
165. See supra note 148.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 126-27.
167. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (1987). Section 282 states in pertinent part: "A patent shall be
presumed valid .... The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim
thereof shall rest on the party asserting such invalidity."
168. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1987). See supra note 2 for text of the statute.
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169patent, or
b) made obvious the invention later claimed in the pat-
ent by the addition of the invention offered for sale to the
prior art.170
2. Next, the burden remains on the challenger to prove
that either
a) the offer was accepted such that the invention
offered for sale was sold or was the subject of a valid con-
tract for sale,171 or
b) the invention had been reduced to practice when the
invention was offered for sale. 172
3. If the challenger proves these first two requirements, the
burden shifts to the patent holder to show that the sale or
offer for sale was for experimental purposes. 73
To illustrate how this test is to be applied, consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical. On June 1, 1988, an inventor conceives
and clearly documents a new idea for a lightweight, high-pow-
ered pump. Shortly thereafter the inventor becomes aware of a
need for such a pump in the aircraft industry. Consequently,
on June 15, 1988, before the pump has been embodied in physi-
cal form, the inventor makes a firm offer 174 to sell the pump,
for profit, to an aircraft manufacturer. The firm offer expires
on July 1, 1988.
First, assume that the aircraft manufacturer does not
accept the offer because the inventor cannot prove that the
pump will work as specified. Under the proposed test, the
pump would not be on sale because neither condition of part 2
169. In re Corcoran, 640 F.2d 1331, 1334, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 867, 870; UMC Elecs.,
816 F.2d 647, 656, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1465, 1472. See also supra note 62.
170. In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 988, 145 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 166, 175 (C.C.P.A. 1965),
cert. denied, 383 U.S. 966, 149 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 906 (1966); In re Corcoran, 640 F.2d 1331
1334, 208 U.S.P.Q. at 870. See also supra note 63.
171. Robbins Co. v. Lawrence Mfg., 482 F.2d 426, 428, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 577, 579
(9th Cir. 1973); Western Marine Elec. Co. v. Fururo Elec. Co., 764 F.2d 840, 845, 226
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 334, 338; Gould Inc. v. United States, 579 F.2d 571, 579, 198 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 156, 164 (Ct. Cl. 1978). In each of these cases, the offer for sale was accepted.
172. Great Northern Corp. v. Davis Core & Pad Co., 782 F.2d 159, 165, 228 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 356, 358 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,
758 F.2d 613, 623, 225 U.S.P.Q. 634, 640 (Fed. Cir. 1985); Timely Products Corp. v.
Arron, 523 F.2d 288, 302, 187 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 257, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1975).
173. See, e.g., In re Dybel, 524 F.2d at 1399-401, 187 U.S.P.Q. at 597-99.
174. See U.C.C. § 2-205 (1987), which states that "[an offer . to sell goods ...
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is not revocable, for lack of
consideration, during the time stated or if no time is stated for a reasonable time .... "
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has been satisfied: the offer for sale was not accepted, and the
pump was not reduced to practice.
Next, assume that, after further consideration, the airline
manufacturer decides to accept the offer and does so on June
25, 1988. Since the offer for sale was accepted and the parties
formed a valid contract for sale, the one-year grace period
begins under part 2(a) of the proposed test, and the inventor
must file for patent protection before June 25, 1989.
Now assume that the offer was not accepted, but that the
inventor reduced the pump to practice on June 25, 1988. Since
the firm offer is still open, the invention was reduced to prac-
tice while the pump was being offered for sale. Therefore,
under part 2(b) of the proposed test, the pump has been placed
on sale and the inventor must file for patent protection before
June 25, 1989.
If the inventor does not reduce the pump to practice until
August 1, 1988, however, the later reduction to practice does
not transform the June 15 offer to sell into a placing "on sale"
within the meaning of section 102(b). Under part 2(b) of the
proposed test, the invention must be reduced to practice at the
time of the offer to sell, and in this case the offer to sell
expired prior to the reduction to practice.
Now assume that the pump was reduced to practice prior
to June 15, 1988, the date on which the inventor offered the
pump for sale. Clearly, under the proposed test the pump
offered for sale must be patented prior to June 15, 1989,
because it had been reduced to practice and offered for sale on
June 15, 1988. Assume further that the inventor did not file
the patent application until June 30, 1989, but that the inven-
tor made improvements in the pump's design after June 30,
1988, that .made the claimed pump different from the pump
offered for sale. The question then becomes whether the
inventor may patent the claimed invention because it differs
from the invention offered for sale.
Under the section 102(b)/103 bar, the original pump
offered for sale on June 15, 1988, becomes part of the prior art.
Therefore, under part 1(b) of the proposed test, if the claimed
pump is obvious in view of the pump offered for sale, then the
claimed pump is not patentable. This is so regardless of
whether the improvements to the pump were ever reduced to
practice. If, however, the claimed pump is not obvious in view
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of the pump offered for sale, the improvements on the pump
offered for sale are patentable.
There are three final situations that must be covered by
the proposed test. The first is when a complex invention is
comprised of several sub-systems. For example, the invention
incorporates three sub-systems, two of which are part of the
prior art, and the third of which has been tested to the inven-
tor's satisfaction. Under part 2 of the proposed test, if the offer
to sell is not accepted, the invention cannot be placed on sale
until the invention has been reduced to practice by the integra-
tion of the three sub-systems.
The next situation is when the invention is a device that is
so simple that there is no question whether it will work as
intended. For example, consider a design patent for a doll,
which has been rendered in an accurate drawing. Under part 2
of the proposed test, the doll would not be on sale until it is
reduced to practice, which requires that the doll exist in physi-
cal form. The proposed test does not provide an exception to
the reduction to practice requirement for simple inventions.
Courts will be unable consistently to determine when an
invention is simple enough not to require a reduction to
practice.
Further, to provide such an exception would only shift the
uncertainty of determining whether an invention has been
placed on sale to the question of when an invention is so sim-
ple that reduction to practice is not necessary. Thus, the sug-
gested test does not provide an exception to the reduction to
practice requirement for simple inventions because such an
exception provides for disparate treatment of inventors and
introduces uncertainty into the test's application.
Finally, consider a situation where the inventor offers to
sell a device that has not yet been conceived. For example, an
aircraft manufacturer contracts to sell an aircraft, which is still
in development, to be delivered five years from the date of the
contract. From the performance specifications, it is clear that
the aircraft must include a pump of new design superior to
that of the art at the time of the contract. If the aircraft manu-
facturer designs and builds such a pump, will the contract for
sale preclude the aircraft manufacturer from obtaining patent
protection for the pump?
Under part 1 of the test, the offer to sell must be of an
invention that anticipates or makes obvious the later claimed
1988]
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invention. In the hypothetical, the offer to sell is not an offer
to sell any invention that meets the requirements of part 1 of
the test. Clearly, the aircraft manufacturer will deliver a new
pump in five years. However, the contract for sale insuffi-
ciently defines the pump for the purposes of part 1 of the test.
Because the pump has not been conceived at the time of the
contract for sale, no invention exists that can anticipate or
render obvious the claimed invention.
Accordingly, under part 2(b), the grace period will not
begin until the aircraft manufacturer leduces the pump to
practice. Further, at that point, the parameters of the inven-
tion are sufficiently defined for the purposes of part 1 of the
test, and failing to disclose the invention to the PTO could con-
travene the policies of prohibiting detrimental public reliance
and encouraging prompt disclosure of inventions. Thus, the
contract for sale and the subsequent reduction to practice start
the one-year grace period, and the manufacturer must file the
patent application within one year from the date of reduction
to practice.1 75
As illustrated by its application to the above hypotheticals,
the proposed test accomplishes the three goals of a test apply-
ing the on sale bar.
First, the test satisfies each of the policies underlying the
on sale bar. Part 2(a) of the test precludes the inventor from
commercially exploiting the pump beyond the statutory period
by finding the pump on sale when the inventor entered into a
contract for sale. Part 2(b) ensures that, when members of the
public could come into possession of the pump because it has
been reduced to practice, they will not rely to their detriment
beyond the one-year grace period. Part 2(b) also promotes
prompt disclosure by forcing the inventor to file within one
year after the completed pump has been shown to work as
intended, but also ensures that the inventor has a chance to
evaluate the commercial prospects of his pump for the one-
year grace period set by Congress. Finally, part 2(b) gives the
inventor and his or her patent counsel sufficient time to sub-
mit a complete patent application to the PTO.
175. The realities of the marketplace may require sellers to enter into contracts
many years before a product is to be sold. See generally Shatterproof Glass, 758 F.2d at
621, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 639 ("architectural glass for construction projects is normally
ordered months or years in advance"). Section 102(b) should not be used to frustrate
the course of legitimate business practices.
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Second, courts will be able to consistently and predictably
apply the proposed test. Under part 2(b), both courts and pat-
ent counsel will know that the grace period began when the
inventor reduced the pump to practice. Since there is a well-
established body of law for determining when an invention has
been reduced to practice, the concerned parties will know with
certainty when the grace period began. Furthermore, under
part 2(a), the courts will be able to easily identify the starting
of the grace period by the contract for sale between the inven-
tor and the aircraft manufacturer. Hence, under either
requirement, the starting of the grace period will be certain.
Finally, the proposed test is consistent with precedent. It
refines the Timely Products test, which has been repeatedly
applied. The only difference is that part 2(a) allows a court to
find that the invention was on sale without a reduction to prac-
tice if the inventor directly profited from the invention prior to
the reduction to practice.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The on sale bar precludes issuance of valid patents on
inventions that have been on sale in this country for more than
one year. The bar is designed to further four policy considera-
tions. When applying the on sale bar, the courts have rejected
the on hand doctrine in favor of a test that requires only that
the challenger show that the invention was reduced to practice
at the time of the offer to sell. In UMC, the CAFC rejected the
requirement of a reduction to practice and instead adopted a
test that required the courts to consider all of the circum-
stances surrounding the offer to sell the invention when decid-
ing whether to apply the bar.
In his dissent in UMC, Judge Smith concluded that the
court was bound by precedent to require a reduction to prac-
tice before applying the bar. Even if precedent did not require
a reduction to practice, however, the reasons given by the
panel majority did not support its conclusion that a reduction
to practice should not be a requirement of the on sale bar.
Finally, the application of the all circumstances test will
be problematical because the UMC court did not give a stan-
dard by which courts can determine when less than a reduc-
tion to practice is sufficient to invoke the bar. Also, the all
circumstances test does not advance the policies underlying the
on sale bar.
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Accordingly, this Note proposes a test that requires a
showing of reduction to practice unless the inventor has actu-
ally commercially exploited the invention. This test provides
the certainty required by a statutory provision that acts, essen-
tially, like a statute of limitations. Further, it more fully satis-
fies Congress' express intent to provide inventors with a time
period within which to decide to file for patent protection.
Michael R. Schacht
